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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of my thesis is to gain a better understanding of Immanuel Kant's notion of
practical reason. Kant's notion of practical reason is embedded in a moral theory in which
he claims to have discovered the supreme principle of morality. The significance of this
principle is that it serves universally as a moral standard that will apply equally to
everybody. It is this same universal element that has been subjected to strong critiques
which have proven difficult to overcome.

Alternatives to Kant's theory are problematic, however. Utilitarian philosophers, like
David Hume, claim that moral standards should comply with the principle of utility.
According to Hume, that set of rules of action which bring about the general happiness or
welfare is best. This theory contains at least two difficulties. The first is that people's
ideas of happiness or the general welfare differ. It is, thus, difficult to determine a general
standard of happiness or welfare toward which behavioral maxims should strive. The
second difficulty is that morality becomes goal or consequence oriented. It thus becomes
conceivable that the sacrifice of a minority's happiness would be acceptable in this theory
for the good of the whole or the happiness of the majority. For example, a system of
slavery might accord with utilitarianism if it can be shown that the happiness of nonslaves vastly outweighs the unhappiness of the slaves. Any such analysis will also bring
up the problem of definition as well.
My initial attraction to Kantian theory arose from my dissatisfaction with utilitarianbased ethics. The first difficulty I had with utilitarianism is that it equates the "right" with
that which maximizes "the good." For example, the argument that capitalism might be the
"supreme" principle governing society is ultimately based on the utilitarian position. The
reasoning behind such an argument is that capitalist methods would create the greatest
efficiency in all aspects of public life. Thus, theoretically, problems such as
discrimination against minorities would not occur for such a practice would in the end be
"inefficient." In other words, the "good" of efficiency should (theoretically) determine
what is "right." I found such arguments to be completely unsatisfactory; what if
practicing discrimination actually turns out to be efficient? Defining the "right" as prior
to the good, however, proved to be a very difficult task. I was attracted to Kant because
he claims to have found this elusive explanation in his expression of the moral law--what
he calls the "categorical imperative."
Hegel, in his critique of Kant, questions Kant's categorical imperative as the test or
criterion for moral standards. Hegel seems to believe that the categorical imperative is
"impotent" as a test in that any behavior (even obviously immoral behavior) can pass
Kant's requirements. Furthermore, Hegel argues that the categorical imperative fails to
produce a universal list of moral duties. Hegel attributes these weaknesses to the
"formalism" of Kant's principle. In the following, we shall decide whether Hegel's
criticisms of Kant's moral principle are valid.
The difficulty with ethical theories is that they exist within the context of a complete
philosophical doctrine. Since they attempt to supply us with a type of knowledge (moral
knowledge), they rely on the epistemological convictions of the theory's author. For
example, Hume holds the empirical view that all knowledge arises from sense
experience. Another school of philosophers, the rationalists, believes that true knowledge
is found by way of reason or the mind alone. These theories differ and each needs
justification. The strength of a moral theory, therefore, depends not only'on its moral
claims but on those of the epistemological theory on which it rests. Kant constructed his
own theory of knowledge for he was not satisfied with those that existed in his time--this
he called "the critical philosophy." In the first chapter of this thesis, I will evaluate the
relevant aspects of Kant's background, epistemological theory. With these ideas

understood, I can then discuss in the second section what Kant expressly says on the
nature of practical reason and afterwards, respond to the famous Hegelian criticism of
Kant's ethics. Practical reason, according to Kant, is what directs our choice of action
whereas theoretical reason determines our knowledge of objects. In the final section I will
focus on what Kant calls the justification of his doctrine. I shall argue that, although not
without problems, Kant's ethical theory seems to be the best one around.

CHAPTER 1
THEORETICAL REASON
Critical or pure philosophy, according to Kant, is the study of the a priori principles that
govern our knowledge. The category of a priori knowledge, particularly of a priori
synthetic knowledge, is controversial, however, and in need of justification. Kant
conducts his defense in his Critique of Pure Reason. The aim of this critique is not only
to justify synthetic a priori knowledge but to make an extensive inquiry into all valid
types and conditions of rational knowledge. Kant is interested in the relationship between
reason and experience. Empiricists claim, for instance, that all knowledge is derived from
experience. Based on this view, David Hume, for example, constructs an extremely
skeptical view of what humans can know. Hume maintains that knowledge can only
consist of sense impressions and their copies which he calls "ideas." Hume then argues
that the connections between sense impressions reveal no necessary order (1). For
instance, our belief that the sun will rise tomorrow cannot be considered certain; just
because the sun rose yesterday and today, it is not necessarily the case that it will rise
tomorrow. Hume concludes that what humans take to be necessary is really only the
"constant conjunction" of the two events. Habit joins the two together in thought. Thus,
although much of our ordinary knowledge involves the idea of necessary connection,
Hume insists that such knowledge is "without foundation." By contrast, Kant thinks that
much of our ordinary knowledge is beyond doubt and an established fact. The
tremendous success of modern science, particularly physics, also argues against Hume's
position. Kant must, therefore, construct an alternative epistemological theory.
Kant's first statement in the introduction to his first Critique "that all our knowledge
begins with experience there can be no doubt..." (2), represents a different epistemology
than the empiricist's claim that all knowledge "arises" out of experience. Kant means that
knowledge begins with experience in a temporal sense. Kant believes it possible
nonetheless that our empirical knowledge could consist of a "compound of that which we
receive through impressions and that which our faculty of cognition supplies from
itself"(3); that it possesses a non-experiential element. Kant believes further that our
reason can isolate in thought the latter contribution by removing everything empirical
from it. This kind of pure knowledge Kant terms a priori(logically prior to sense
experience) while empirical knowledge or knowledge acquired through sense experience
is considered posteriori.

According to Kant, if a priori knowledge is supplied by the cognitive faculty, it follows
that it does not come from and is thus independent of sense experience. Kant is not
interested in understanding propositions that are a priori in a relative sense. For example,
it may be claimed that when the correct key is used, one knows a priori that the door will
unlock. This proposition is relatively a priori for it applies only to this particular
experience. It is, therefore, strictly speaking, incorrect to say that "one knows a priori
that the correct key will unlock the door" for the following reason. Such knowledge of
unlocking the door must have been derived from previous experiences and this
knowledge is independent only of this particular experience; hence, we are still talking
about empirical knowledge. By contrast, true priori knowledge must be independent of all
experience. Kant gives the example that "every change has a cause" as being a valid
priori proposition (4). He believes not only that this judgment cannot arise out of
empirical experience, since we cannot experience every change, but that the principle
seems to be applicable to all experience; it is, in fact, an axiom of modern scientific
method.
Since the a priori propositions which Kant has in mind (such as "every change has a
cause") are not contingent on any experience, it follows that they are universal. In other
words, if the a priori propositions are not relative, they must be universal. Furthermore,
for Kant, universality in this sense is strict universality (5) which in turn seems
synonymous with necessity. Kant claims that if a proposition is true universally, it is true
in all instances, meaning it is necessarily true. Conversely, if a proposition is necessarily
true, it is true universally. Therefore, in Kant's view, a priori propositions are both
necessary and universal. Perhaps this description by two synonymous terms is meant to
illuminate two different aspects involved. Whereas universality may denote truth in every
instance, necessity may denote the impossibility of exception. Kant also claims, however,
that any necessary and universal propositions must be a priori (6), though this has yet to
be qualified for it does not immediately follow from the preceding analysis.
Before Kant, Hume had already argued that the certainty of necessary and universal
relationships can not be empirically proven. For Hume, there are necessary and universal
relations between our ideas (like "all circles are round") but these are ultimately analytic
definitions and do not necessarily tell us anything about real objects of the world. For
example the proposition: "All unicorns have horns" is true but tells us nothing about the
world. When it comes to knowledge of experience, however, Hume's claim is that no
amount of experience of a repetitively occurring event can be the basis for the deduction
of a universal claim. Based on the empirical theory of knowledge, Hume concludes that
universal claims like "every event must have a cause" can achieve no certainty. Since we
are not able to experience every event, we can not deduce that each has a cause. Hume
claims that we make these judgments by means of induction which is ultimately an
unjustifiable method.
It is important to note that Kant agrees with Hume regarding the impossibility of
empirically deducing universal claims (7). However, Kant does think that it may still be
possible to justify universal claims about experience for he does not begin with the
empirical view that all knowledge is based on experience. Since universal judgments

cannot be derived empirically or a posterJori, if they exist, they must exist a priori.
Therefore, any actual universal and necessary propositions must be a priori. Before
addressing the actual existence of a priori knowledge, I must explain the important
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments in Kant. Basically following Hume,
Kant argues that judgments can be "analytic" or "synthetic." In analytic judgments, the
predicate is already contained in the concept of the subject. An example is "apples are
fruit." This judgement is analytic because being a fruit is contained in the concept of an
apple; it is part of its definition. In a synthetic judgment, by contrast, the predicate makes
an addition to the concept of the subject. An example of this type of judgment is "Those
apples are red." This judgment is synthetic because being red is not contained in the
concept of an apple (some apples are yellow, etc.). Analytic and synthetic judgments, as
well as a priori-a posteriori judgments, are mutually exclusive. If a judgment is not
analytic, then it must be synthetic. Either the predicate adds to the subject or it does not.
No third alternative is possible. Similarly, if a judgment is not a posteriori, then it must
be a priori. Either the knowledge is derived independently of experience or it is not.
Some logical relationships exist between both of the preceding distinctions. In an analytic
judgment, there is no need to go beyond the preconceived notion of the subject to attain
the predicate. It can, therefore, be formed independently of experience and can accurately
be described as a priori. Since analytic judgments can only be a priori, a posteriori
judgments must be synthetic. However, it does not logically follow that all synthetic
judgments are a posteriori nor that all a priori judgments are analytic. Kant believes that
there is a category of synthetic a priori judgments. In fact, it is his theory's most
significant (if controversial) epistemological contribution. An example of a synthetic a
priori judgment is "every event has a cause." Such a claim is to be distinguished from the
judgment that "every effect has a cause." This latter judgment is analytic because having
a cause is contained in the concept of an effect. However, having a cause is not contained
in the concept of an event. An event is merely something that happens. Thus, the former
judgment is "synthetic." Kant claims that it is also known a priori for it is impossible to
experience every event. Nonetheless, "that every event has a cause" is a basic principle of
modern science which Kant takes as fact.
If one holds the empirical view, that all knowledge arises out of experience, such a
category is impossible. For all synthetic judgments contain new knowledge (something
added to the subject) and thus, on the empirical view, they can only be known posteriori.
Analytic and a priori propositions must also be equivalent on the empirical view. If it is
the case that knowledge must be derived from experience then any a priori proposition
must be analytic, where there is no addition to the subject. For empiricists, the distinction
between analytic and synthetic judgments is, therefore, equivalent to the a priori-a
posteriori distinction.
Kant, however, claims that synthetic a priori propositions do actually exist and they can
be found in the sciences of mathematics and physics. In fact, they seem to form the very
basis of such sciences. For Kant, what is at stake here is the very possibility of certainty
in knowledge itself. Such depends on the existence of a priori principles. Clearly we

verify truth claims by submitting them to objectively valid principles. True objectivity,
for Kant, implies the absence of empirical conditions (8).
According to Kant, all mathematical judgments are synthetic a priori (9). He uses the
example of "7 + 5 = 12." Such a judgment is considered a priori because of its necessity.
Kant claims that it is synthetic, because it is not analytic. That is, for Kant, to be analytic
means that the predicate must either be already contained in or follow logically from the
subject. In analytic judgments, the connection between the subject and predicate is
thought "through identity" (10). He claims that the proposition "7 + 5 = 12" appears
analytic as it accords with the principle of contradiction (11). However, if we look only to
the concept of the union of seven and five, Kant claims that the concept of twelve is not
arrived at "through identity" or by a purely logical analysis. He claims, instead, that to
find the actual sum, we need "to call in the assistance of intuition" (12). What this
"assistance of sensuous intuition" entails exactly is unclear to me, however, his
description of how we discover the actual sum reveals why he believes mathematical
judgments to be synthetic. To find the sum of seven and five, Kant claims we must
separate one of the numbers into units and then add them, one by one, to the other. Thus,
Kant believes that mathematical problems are solved through a process more complex
then logical analysis.
Kant also claims that geometrical judgments are synthetic a priori. He uses the example
that "the shortest distance between two points is a straight line" (13). This judgment is
synthetic because the conception of a straight line does not already include the notion of
the "shortest distance." Nonetheless, this judgment is a necessary proposition in
geometry, axiomatic and, therefore, a priori.
Kant claims physics, too, possesses synthetic a priori principles. He claims the
proposition: "In all changes in the material world, the quantity of matter remains
unchanged" (14), is synthetic for the unchanging quantity of matter is not contained in the
conception of a material change. Nonetheless, physics accepts this principle absolutely
(or at least did in Kant's day). For Kant, the necessity of the preceding proposition is
"clear" (15) while Hume concludes that all universal claims, including those in physics,
are unjustifiable. Again, Kant believes that the tremendous successes and unceasing
progress in physics and mathematics establish them as fact. In the end, Kant's view is that
philosophical theories must conform in the face of these facts, for science will not cease
to exist in the face of philosophical theories.
Thus, even if mathematical propositions turn out not to be synthetic a priori, those found
in physics are enough to ground the existence of such propositions. Conversely, if
mathematics does, in fact, consist of synthetic a priori judgments, Kant's doctrine would
seem to be above reproach.
Because Kant is convinced that a priori knowledge is actual, he next seeks to explain
how it is possible. He regards the empiricist's view that all knowledge arises out of
experience as totally inadequate to explain our a priori knowledge. He also uncovers an
assumption on which the empiricist's view is based. "Hitherto it has been assumed that all

our knowledge must conform to objects" (16). If no knowledge can originate from within
ourselves, then our mind must passively conform to objects given through our senses.
The passivity of the mind, however, can not be empirically proven and is thus, ultimately,
an assumption. Since on this assumption we must deny the universality and necessity of
scientific and (possibly) mathematical knowledge, Kant suggests an alternative
hypothesis; that our minds actively make objects conform to our knowledge. On this
hypothesis our a priori knowledge can be explained.
Kant claims his reasoning is analogous to the "Copernican Revolution" in science (17).
Copernicus observed that the immediate phenomena of the sun's movement could be
explained not only on a geocentric hypothesis but by a heliocentric one as well. In fact,
the heliocentric hypothesis became the superior one because it could explain and unify
more astronomical phenomena than could the geocentric hypothesis. Similarly, Kant
claims that empirical (a posteriori) knowledge can be explained by either Hume's or his
own hypothesis. Synthetic a priori knowledge, however, as well as the certainty and
progress of the natural sciences, could only be explained on his view knowledge can be
explained.Thus, Kant's hypothesis is superior.
In assuming that objects conform to the activity of the mind, Kant does not mean that the
mind changes the empirical world. The term "object" in the preceding statement refers to
objects of our knowledge: not to objects as they exist independently. According to Kant,
the objects that we sense are subjected to a priori conditions in order to become objects
of our knowledge. Kant discovers twelve such conditions which he calls the pure
concepts of the understanding, or the categories (18).
Though, Kant's hypotheses is meant to account for our various types of ordinary
knowledge, it does place at least one new restriction on our knowing; our knowledge
becomes limited to objects of our knowledge. At this point, Kant distinguishes between
phenomena and noumena. We are unable, he claims, to have knowledge of objects as
they exist independently of us as knowing subjects. Our knowledge consists of what is, in
part, always supplied by our own minds. To have knowledge of an empirical or "outside"
object (phenomenon) necessarily implies a relationship between object and knowing
subject. What is controversial is whether our knowledge of objects (phenomena) differs
from apprehending sensual objects as they would exist independently of us, or as Kant
says, as "things in themselves" (noumena). Kant's hypothesis does seem to necessitate an
alteration of our conception of the objects we sense for they must conform with certain a
priori principles grasped by our rational minds.
A review of Kant's reasoning reveals many correlations with the method of modern
science. Kant begins, for instance, with the immediate phenomena of our knowledge and
constructs a comprehensive theory that succeeds in explaining it. By contrast, other
philosophical schools, namely empiricists and rationalists, seem to begin with a
commitment to first principles and they construct theories from them. These theories
often end in contradiction or skepticism for they do not seek an adequate correlation with
the phenomenal realm. Hume, for example, begins his theory with the principle that all
knowledge arises out of experience. On this assumption, Hume is forced to conclude that

we can have no certain empirical knowledge nor knowledge of empirical universal
relationships. This seems counter intuitive given physics and geometry. Kant shows that
if Hume's conclusions are accepted, experience as we know it would not be possible.
Though Kant's theory may contain problems, his attempt is to construct an
epistemological theory that correlates closely with our phenomenal knowledge.

CHAPTER 2
PRACTICAL REASON
As creatures with reason, we not only think but act. It is then possible that our reasoning
faculty can influence our actions as well as our thoughts. Kant attempts to find the limits
and conditions of reason's practical influence just as he did with reason's theoretical
influence. In both cases Kant uses the same "critical" method. In his first Critique, this
involves examining our ordinary knowledge and finding the necessary conditions for
possessing such knowledge. Kant discovers that some of our knowledge is "synthetic a
priori" which in turn cannot be explained under any existing epistemological theories. As
discussed in Chapter One, Kant then formulates his own hypothesis which maintains that
sensuous objects are subjected to a priori conditions given by pure reason in order to
become objects of knowledge. He claims his view should be accepted because it best
explains ordinary knowledge such as physics and mathematics.
A critical inquiry of practical reason, by contrast, will differ from that of theoretical
knowledge insofar as there are apparently no established and accepted practical principles
to examine as there are theoretical ones (i.e. the principles of mathematics and physics).
Thus Kant first examines our ordinary moral experience (an experience unique to rational
beings) and seeks the basis of such experience. Kant claims he is not attempting to
construct new moral duties or principles but only clarifying existing ones (19) upon
which we already, if confusedly, act.
I shall begin my account of Kant's notion of practical reason by contrasting his view,
once again, with Hume's. I discussed in Chapter One that Hume viewed reason as
"passive." Hume holds this position regarding reason's practical function as well. In
general, reason is defined by Hume as "the discovery of truth or falsehood" (20).There
are two methods which reason uses to make such judgments of truth; it can find truth in
the "relations of ideas" or by "matters of fact" (21). Hume calls the former method a
judgment of demonstration and the latter a judgment of probability (22). In the former
method Hume is referring to mathematical and logical deductions. Through this type of
reasoning, we are able to attain certainty. However, this certainty regards only our ideas
which are distinct from the actual world. Ideas, for Hume, are merely "copies" of our
"impressions" which in turn are only sensory images (23). A necessarily true relation of
any idea may give certain knowledge of our ideas of reality, but not of factual reality
itself. An example is the proposition: "2 + 2 = 4." The truth of this proposition is
necessary and universal. However, since a number is only an idea and not an

independently existing object in the empirical world, such a proposition reveals no
necessary relationship between objects in the world. It merely shows a relation of an idea
of an object to another idea.
Hume says that "all reasonings concerning matters of fact seem to be founded on the
relation of cause and effect" (24) for such is the discovery of relations between real
existences as opposed to their copies (ideas). However, it is impossible to confirm causal
relations empirically. Hume claims that you cannot find the causal relationship by
examining objects which appear to be causally related because "the effect is totally
different from the cause and consequently can never be discovered in it" (25).
Furthermore, an experience of a "constant conjunction" between two objects is, strictly
speaking, just that. No necessary relation can be deduced from a constant conjunction.
Hume uses the example of the sun rising everyday. Here is an apparent necessary
relationship, but Hume shows that it would not be contrary to reason if the sun did not
rise one day. "Were it (the sun not rising one day) demonstratively false, it would imply a
contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind" (26). Hence, this type
of matter of fact reasoning gives us factual knowledge of the world but it is only probable
rather than certain and demonstrative.
If reason is to motivate the will, then for Hume, it must be by one of the two preceding
ways. Since demonstration involves ideas and volitions involve reality, Hume says that
"the two must be totally removed from each other" (27). He claims, for example, that
mathematical reasoning may be useful in mechanical operations, yet we only employ
such operations to attain a desired end. Thus demonstrative reasoning alone can not
motivate the will without being moved by a prior desire. It can only influence the means
to satisfy the desire.
In a similar manner, Hume finds that reasoning about matters of fact can not alone
motivate the will. For example, if we believe that an object will bring us pleasure, we
may seek to attain it. However, it is our propensity for pleasure that causes us to take
action. Our knowledge of the probable relationship of the object merely directs it. Since
neither of these types of reasoning can alone produce action, then for Hume, only feeling
or passion can produce action. Thus Hume concludes that "reason is and ought only be
the slave of the passions and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey
them" (28).
A passion, according to Hume, is an "original existence," which contains no
"representational quality" (29). By "original existence," Hume seems to mean that a
passion can "originate" action or change existence; a passion is a movement or an
expression of the self. By contrast, a thought or idea is a "representation;" ideas represent
a state of affairs in the world. Hume says that passions, because they have no
representational aspect (unlike thoughts), can not be true or false; they neither correspond
or fail to correspond to anything in the world. Passions merely express subjective feelings
of the self. As such, they are "complete in themselves." Hume finds two instances where
a passion can be called "unreasonable," however. In both instances, though, the passion is

accompanied by some judgment. The first instance is when a passion is "founded on the
supposition of the existence of objects, which really do not exist" (30). For example, I
may wish to fly in a spaceship from Star Trek. This "however insofar as it is not possible
to wish is "unreasonable," however insofar as it is not possible to fulfill because there is
no such actual spaceship. A passion can also be called unreasonable when the means
chosen to satisfy it are insufficient. For example, I may wish to write a book by
tomorrow, yet I am entirely incapable of accomplishing such a feat.
Hume concludes that, unless a passion is accompanied by such a false judgment, it can
not be called unreasonable. He thus claims that, "It is not contrary to reason to prefer the
destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger"(31). Since there is no
logical contradiction nor any foundation on some phantom object, reason is incapable of
criticizing such a preference. Hume does not claim that a person proclaiming such a
preference would not be immoral, only that it is not our reason which tells us this.
Nonetheless, morality's influence on human actions is an empirical fact (32).
Regarding the origin of morality, Hume thus concludes that since morality indeed
influences our actions and reason alone can not, then moral distinctions are not derived
from reason. He argues that a moral feeling or sentiment is the only alternative (33). If a
certain feeling is what distinguishes what is morally right or wrong or, as Hume says,
virtue and vice, then we must become aware of such distinctions by the impressions
which they give us. Hume maintains that the impression from virtue is generally
agreeable and that from vice is uneasy. Thus an explanation of why an action, character,
or sentiment causes us pleasure or pain is an explanation of the virtue or vice (34).
Hume claims that virtues can be either "natural" or "artificial." This distinguishes those
impressions that arise naturally like a natural desire to care for one's child from those that
arise "by means of an artifice or contrivance" (35). Justice is, for Hume, an example of an
artificial virtue (36). A sense of justice causes people to regulate their behavior according
to conventional rules. These rules are "artificial" insofar as they prohibit actions which
may normally bring about immediate pleasure in order to increase the welfare of the
general public. For example, taking someone's food may bring about some immediate
satisfaction. However, Hume argues that one should decide to refrain from such behavior
providing that others also refrain. For following the convention of private ownership
upholds the institution of property which in turn has been shown generally to increase the
public welfare and security. Hume finds that the value of any convention can be
measured in its usefulness to society as a whole. Our knowledge that rules of justice
increase the public welfare becomes a part of our general character in turn by affecting
our moral sentiment.
At this point, I have given a brief overview of Hume's conception of the practical
function of reason. Reason can influence action only if there exists a prior passion or
desire in the agent. Reason can, thus, only contribute the means to the satisfaction of a
passion. A moral sentiment found in all people is a possible cause to action and it seeks
the ends which virtue tends to promote. These ends are simply those that are useful (37).
Thus, reason, when directed by the moral sentiment, seeks the general welfare or utility.

Our moral sentiment discerns what is useful by judging either general approbation or the
contribution to the public welfare.
Most people would not Object to the practical function which Hume found reason to
possess. It is, in fact, a significant part of Kant's theory and it is incorporated into his
notion of the hypothetical imperative. According to Kant, when one is possessed by a
desire, reason may present the means for satisfying the desire through an imperative of
the best means. Such may be called the practical use of empirical reason. It is empirical
because such an imperative is ultimately grounded on sensuous desires; it is practical
because it can actually influence the means undertaken to satisfy the desire.
It is not readily acceptable, however, that reason's practical influence is limited to that of
finding means to "originally existing" ends. Such a view comes dangerously close to the
idea that people may not be responsible for their actions. For, since our reason can not
determine our ends, we might often be possessed by natural desires which we would
apparently have no choice but to follow.
Kant claims his own view will, in the end, provide a better account of ordinary morality
than that of Hume. Ordinary moral deliberation seems, in contrast to Hume, to be
concerned often with motives rather than simply with actions and their consequences.
Kant attempts to illustrate the importance of motives in ordinary moral deliberation with
his example of a grocer who does not overcharge his inexperienced customer (38). For
Hume, as long as such an action is, as a general rule, good for the public welfare, it is
morally good. Kant agrees that the grocer's action accords with duty, but nonetheless
asserts that the moral value of such behavior depends on the grocer's motive. If the grocer
is motivated to deal honestly simply because it is "good for business," then even the
ordinary person would not consider the person "virtuous;" for the ordinary person knows
that such a person may cheat if it proves "good for business." If this is so, then Hume's
theory seems to lack an essential part of our moral experience. Once again, Kant starts
with the opposite hypothesis from Hume that reason is not passive, but active, and it can
directly determine actions. Since, as Hume contends, it is impossible to empirically
confirm the causality of our volitions, it would seem equally impossible to deny
(empirically) an alternative causal relation.
In order to find how reason can determine action Kant looks to people's maxims. He
claims that the actions of rational beings can be determined by their maxims. A maxim is
a subjective principle which determines the rational will (39). It is subjective because it is
valid for, meaning it determines the will only of, a particular person (as opposed to all
people). It is a principle because it can be applied in similar circumstances. For instance,
say I decide to cheat on an exam because I felt I would otherwise fail. The maxim of this
choice can be formulated as follows: "I will cheat on an exam if it is necessary to pass." If
another such situation were to arise again, and I act in a principled manner, I would
likewise apply this same principle. What distinguishes us as creatures with reason from
other natural objects, according to Kant, is that we can act according to our ideas of laws
(or principles) as opposed just to conforming to law (40).

The claim that people act on maxims is not inconsistent with the position of Hume. As
long as the underlying motive is not determined by reason, Hume would accept that we
may form principles on which to act. For example, Hume may admit my preceding
example ("I will cheat on exams..") as a principle of volition. He will qualify the end,
however, as having its origin in oursensuous desires or passions. Hume may say that the
desire to pass exams is based on the belief of completing certain educational
requirements which in turn is a requirement for a pleasurable life. However, the final
cause of the end of any act is, for Hume, the propensity for pleasure or the aversion to
pain. The final cause is thus given by sensuous inclination which must be the ground of
any maxim.
In general, unless an action is a mere physical reflex, it must in some sense be
"voluntary." Voluntary actions must have a purpose, for why else would a person decide
to act? This purpose or object must be empirical for our actions take place in the
empirical world. Thus all maxims must contain an empirical object as well. Hume
maintains that the desire for this empirical object can be the only possible motive for our
actions. Kant, by contrast, here argues that maxims actually contain two elements, either
of which may serve as a sufficient motive; an empirical content or the a priori form of
law (41). In Kant's view, the form of a maxim or its a priori is equivalent to the form of a
law. Kant claims that this form can only be supplied, a priori, from pure reason because
the concept of universal law cannot be found in sensuous experience. So if the will is
determined by a maxim's a priori element, as opposed to its empirical content, then it
would be pure practical reason that is determining the will.
Kant formulates this a priori principle of determination in the form of an imperative as
follows: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim
should become a universal law" (42). He calls this formulation the categorical imperative
because it applies unconditionally to all rational and reasonable beings as opposed to
hypothetical imperatives which determine the rational will only when particular sensuous
desires are the primary motive.
As creatures with reason, we can be described as "reasonable" as well as "rational." In
fact, the German term, "Vernunft" is defined as both reasonable and rational (43v. John
Rawls, in a recent work (44), claims that this distinction, has its origin in Kant's
distinction between the categorical and hypothetical imperative. The former (the
categorical imperative) represents pure practical reason, whereas the latter (the
hypothetical imperative) represents empirical practical reason. Rawls associates the
"reasonable" with the willingness to propose and honor fair terms of cooperation, while
the "rational" he associates with powers of judgment and the choosing of instrumental
means to ends. Hume's theory grasps only the latter. In claiming that reason can only
supply means to originally existing ends, Hume implies that reason only entails the
"rational" thought process. Hume does claim that we also seek to promote the public
welfare. However, this pursuit is driven either by moral sentiment or a roundabout
method of satisfying our own desires. Thus this apparent interest in the good of others has
its origin, according to Hume, in our sensuous faculty rather than in our reason. By
showing how reason can supply the motive for acting in a universal manner, by contrast,

Kant is illustrating our capacity to be "reasonable." Fair terms of cooperation are such
that all reasonable people could accept them. As will be made clear, this seems to
correspond directly with what the categorical imperative commands.
If one were to subject a prospective action to the categorical imperative then the principle
of determination would be conformity to universal law. Such a principle is not
empirically conditioned for the form of universal law is not based on sensuous
experience. One may deny that a person whose actions seems to be in accordance with
this principle is actually moved to act from reason, however such a denial, again, cannot
be empirically confirmed. It is Kant's claim that in order for reason to originate action the
motive must be supplied from pure reason. This motive (which Kant claims is embodied
in the categorical imperative) is reverence for the law. Such a motive is unique to
reasonable beings. Whereas everything else in nature seems to act in accordance with
laws, only reasonable beings can act from their idea of, or reverence for, law. All other
motives, according to Kant, are derived from sensuous experience.
Kant claims that the categorical imperative is the imperative of morality (45) for it
determines the will independently of the sensuous motives of which ordinary moral
deliberation is suspect. In the form of a principle it is the moral law because this
principle, like a law, is unconditioned. If we look again to his example of the grocer who
deals honestly because it is, overall, good for his business, it is evident that the behavior
is not determined by the categorical imperative. If, however, the grocer acted in such a
way because he thought it was how all grocers should act, then this would be equivalent
to being determined from the categorical imperative and thus, according to Kant, have
moral value. The grocer would be doing the right thing for its own sake. Furthermore,
once convinced that the dutiful behavior is done without any ulterior motive but for
duty's sake, the ordinary person would consider the grocer's act to be moral. Thus, Kant's
account of what is involved in our moral deliberation seems to be more accurate than that
of Hume for the latter's view does not include this seemingly essential aspect; that the
motive be duty and the right act be done for the right reason's or for duty's sake. For this
reason alone, Kant's view should be favored over Hume's, for Kant's theory gives a fuller
account. However, before Kant's can be fully accepted, there are further ramifications
which must still be analyzed.
One consequence of Kant's view, which has already been mentioned, is that reason may
of itself originate action. Since an empirical denial of this claim is impossible, it can not
be the ground for rejecting Kant's theory. Another essential point is that the categorical
imperative serves as "the supreme principle of morality." It is supreme because it is a
universal principle from which all particular moral duties can presumably be derived. The
formulation of the categorical imperative given thus far, however, requires merely that
one be able sincerely to will that one's maxims be fit to be universal laws. Such an
elementary guideline for moral behavior, however, can easily be used to justify obviously
immoral behavior as Hegel recognizes in his famous critique of Kant.
The essence of Hegel's criticism of Kant is captured in the following quote from Hegel's
Philosophy of Riqht:

..if the definition of duty is taken to be the absence of contradiction,..then no transition is
possible to the specification of particular duties nor, if'some such particular content for
acting comes under consideration, is there any criterion in that principle for deciding
whether it is or is not a duty. On the contrary, by this means any wrong or immoral line
of conduct may be justified.(46)
Hegel interprets the categorical imperative as merely commanding action whose general
form is not involved in contradiction when viewed as a universal law; this interpretation
indeed seems to correspond with some of Kant's examples. For instance, after giving his
first formulation, Kant poses the question "Does a lying promise accord with duty" (47)?
He answers, of course, that it does not for to will this maxim as a universal law entails a
contradiction in that the institution of promising could not then exist. A universal
principle of false promising is inconceivable because if all people made false promises
then no one would believe them and thus no one would allow false promises to be made
to them. Thus a sustained universal practice of false promising could not exist.
If maxims had merely to pass the preceding test then Hegel would be correct in saying
both that Kant's notion of duty can justify any behavior and that "no immanent doctrine
of duties is possible". For example, say that a Nazi who is sincere in his beliefs feels that
all Jews should be killed. For him there would be no contradiction in willing such a
conviction as universal law. Furthermore, the test of contradiction is insufficient to
prohibit the willing of different universal laws by different people. Thus Kant's doctrine
would yield an inconsistent set of duties.
According to Kant, however, duty requires more than the universal form of action. These
further requirements are brought out in further formulations of the categorical imperative
which Kant claims are "merely so many formulations of precisely the same law.." (48).
For example, Kant contends that the categorical imperative also contains an end which
functions as the single limiting condition of moral action. This is clearly explained in his
Formula of the End in Itself:
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the
person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end (49).
To treat humans as "ends in themselves" requires that each person one deals with be
allowed (in principle, at least) to choose their own ends at the same time. This
formulation makes explicit what was required implicitly in Kant's previous formulation
emphasizing universal form; what is willed to be a universal law by a particular person
should also be capable of being willed to be universal law by any person with whom he
comes in contact. In this way, my own particular inclination cannot serve as the motive
for moral behavior. Kant illustrates how this second formulation may test for duty with
the same example mentioned above: (50) "Does a lying promise accord with duty?" Kant
claims that misleading someone (by lying to them) for a particular desire is obviously
using that other as a means rather than as an end in themself; for this person (the lied-to)
is never given a chance voluntarily to choose to assist in my end. I thus simply use (fool)
his reason in the service of my own inclination. When Kant says not to treat humanity

"simply as a means," he is not saying that people should never serve as means, only that
they must choose also to do so themselves. For example, in a sense a student uses
teachers as a means to receiving an education, however, they are not used simply as a
means for, at the same time, presumably it is the will of the teachers to supply this
education.
Thus Hegel's claim that Kant's notion of duty can justify any immoral line of conduct is
simply false. The sincere Nazi cannot justify killing Jews through the categorical
imperative because he is not treating Jews as "ends in themselves." The Nazi's action
could never be agreed to by the Jews themselves. Hence, the Nazi's maxim could never
attain to universality. Hegel mistakenly takes the first formulation of the categorical
imperative to be the only formulation; he does not see that the various formulations of the
categorical imperative are really one law. Hegel thus does not grasp the true meaning of
Kant's doctrine.
In regard to Hegel's other criticism that Kant's notion of duty produces "no immanent list
of duties;" this is simply not one of Kant's objectives. Hegel seems to have misunderstood
Kant's aim. Kant is not seeking a list of duties (51). A general list of particular duties,
moreover, seems to be conceptually impossible insofar as people's conventions differ. For
example, in some places (like New York City) people may feel that an unauthorized
entrance onto their property is a severe violation whereas in other places (some rural
areas perhaps) people may be welcome in almost anybody's home. Conventions differ.
Furthermore, by way of the second formulation, Kant does give us, at least, the general
duty that people be allowed to choose their own ends only if compatible with the ends of
others. This general duty, however, will have to be interpreted according to local
customs. At the very least, Kant's general duty does seem to have found acceptance as a
political principle; each person is to be given the maximum amount of liberty limited
only by a like liberty for others (52). Such a principle seems to be essential for modern
Western governments to be considered just.
Kant, in fact, never makes the claim that he will supply a list of particular duties, indeed
he thinks that people already know their moral duties (53). He claims that the sole
objective of The Groundwork is to seek out and establish the supreme principle of
morality (54). Kant establishes the categorical imperative as such "regressively" by an
examination first of our moral experience. If we allow that we make responsible moral
distinctions then we must accept that they are based on some principle. Hume claims that
they are based on the principle of utility. However, this principle does not seem to concur
with ordinary moral experience as we have seen, whereas Kant's principle does. Thus, if
nothing else, Kant seems to have found one condition of our ordinarily confused idea of
morality. We must, afterall, account for the fact that the demand for universal human
rights is causing a tremendous stir in the modern world. Kant does attempt to show a
necessary connection between the categorical imperative and the human will. He claims
that the categorical imperative is a synthetic a priori proposition (55) which he intends to
justify theoretically. This justification will be analyzed in my final chapter.

CHAPTER 3
THE JUSTIFICATION OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON
As a synthetic a priori proposition, the categorical imperative [at least according to Kant)
is in need of justification. This need arises from the necessary connection that is proposed
to exist between two distinct concepts. Kant claims that the categorical imperative is a
priori for it necessarily connects an action to a will without presupposing an empirical
condition. At the same time the categorical imperative is "synthetic" because the act
commanded is not contained in the concept of the human will. Though the human will is
"imperfect" (as limited and sensuous), Kant nonetheless argues that the categorical
imperative commands this will necessarily. The justification must explain why the
categorical imperative should determine the will rather than hypothetical imperatives.
As we saw in Chapter 1, the justification of synthetic a priori theoretical propositions
(i.e. every event has a cause), for Kant, entails the explanation of how they are possible
rather than whether they are possible. As a practical principle, however, the categorical
imperative has a different function than such theoretical principles. Thus the justification
of practical reason may have different requirements. The notion of practical reason, itself,
is difficult to understand for it does not necessarily involve objects of which we can have
certain knowledge. Practical reason involves the deliberation of rational and reasonable
action. Such deliberation need not have its basis in certain knowledge.
The lack of a successful, uncontroversial moral science excludes the type of justification
used with theoretical, synthetic a priori propositions (such at those in mathematics and
physics). Kant does, however, attempt to justify the categorical imperative in at least two
other ways. In the last chapter of The Groundwork, Kant claims that a third term which
includes both concepts of the human will and the categorical imperative is necessary to
justify the necessary connection (56). In his Critique of Practical Reason, however, he
claims that the fact that morality does indeed influence human actions, makes the moral
law a "fact of reason" (57). The existence of the moral law is then taken as a fact of
ordinary morality much like the principles of physics and mathematics is for the natural
sciences.
In order to understand each of Kant's justifications, we must first become familiar with
his third formulation of the categorical imperative. Kant calls it the Formula of
Autonomy:
So act that your will can regard itself as at the same time making universal law by means
of its maxims (58).
The Formula of Autonomy looks very similar to Kant's first formulation. It differs in
that it stresses that each rational will not only acts on maxims but constructs them. The
categorical imperative is a device to show how the will can be determined by reason
rather than sensuous inclination. This third formula merely highlights this constructive

aspect. In acting according to the moral law, rational beings display their autonomy for
they act according to a law which they give to themselves.
Kant claims that the Idea of freedom directs us to the third term which connects the
human will and the obligation of moral law. Freedom is an example of what Kant calls an
"Idea of Reason" (59). Such Ideas are produced by our reason while seeking the
unconditioned. For example, according to Kant, if we assume that natural necessity is the
only type of causality, we will then be faced with a contradiction or with what Kant calls
an "antinomy." If we attempt to comprehend the totality of causes, we need to posit a
primary cause. Otherwise, there could be no totality (the causal chain would never cease
for there would be no origin). Kant thus claims we inevitably form a transcendental Idea
of freedom whose existence we must allow as possible. Theoretical certainty of such
freedom, however, is impossible since a necessary condition of our knowledge is the
assumption of causality (as natural necessity).
Since we can have no certain knowledge by means of Ideas, we can not construct a
positive definition of this possible freedom. We can, however, describe freedom in a
negative sense; freedom cannot be the same as natural necessity. At the very least,
freedom is a property enabling something to occur without its being determined by
natural or outside influences.
A will, according to Kant, is the power to act in accordance with the idea of law (60).
Kant points out that a will which is free, is not the same as a chaotic will; a free will
would have to be determined by principle or law. At the same time, these principles or
laws cannot come from outside sources, or else the will would not be free in the above
established negative sense. Thus, Kant concludes, that the will is free which obeys laws
given to itself by itself. When the will is determined by the categoricalimperative, it
fulfills both of the above requirements for this law reason gives to itself. If the human
will could be shown to be free, then the connection with the categorical imperative would
be justified, for Kant claims that "a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the
same" (61).
Kant's dilemma, however, is that since we can have no certain and positive knowledge of
freedom, we cannot claim from a theoretical standpoint that the human will is free. Kant
then argues that it would be sufficient if we could, instead, show that we necessarily
presuppose our wills to be free when we act (62). That we do in fact make this
presupposition seems correct when we examine, at least, our theoretical judgments. We
generally consider our capacity to reason capable of determining objectively valid
judgments. If we were not free, then our judgments would be the mere product of a causal
chain of previous mental impulses considered as mere mechanisms. In order for us to
consider our judgments to be valid, however, we must consider ourselves able both to
recognize or construct valid principles. Thus, in order to believe in the validity of our
theoretical reason, we must assume we are free. In the same way, presumably, we
consider ourselves largely responsible for our actions. Responsibility, too, implies
freedom for it suggests that we are capable of acting in a way other than the way we
actually do.

So we apparently do presuppose ourselves to be free both in thinking and in our ordinary
action and the categorical imperative would thus seem to be justified. Kant claims,
however, that there is a suspicion that the justification argues in a vicious circle (63).
Since Kant simply equates freedom with being subject to the moral law, the two concepts
(freedom and the principle of autonomy) are reciprocal rather than distinct. Thus, the
justification seems to fail for there is no distinct third term which contains both concepts.
According to Rawls (64), this attempt fails because the presupposition of freedom can
only be seen as necessary in reason's theoretical function: as necessary to form valid
judgments. Practically, however, we may act either autonomously (by submitting
ourselves to the categorical imperative) or heteronomously (by only following
hypothetical imperatives). The latter, however, is not the same as acting morally. Thus
the presupposition of freedom works in the case of theoretical reason alone. Ih general,
Rawls claims that the attempt to justify the categorical imperative through theoretical
reason (or an Idea of theoretical reason) is equivalent to an attempt to derive the
reasonable from the rational (65). Rawls is against such an approach for it implies that the
reasonable needs a basis for which the rational does not. Instead, Rawls views both the
rational and the reasonable, though distinct, as equally fundamental.
In Kant's later work, the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant seems to realize that his
justification in The Groundwork does not work for he claims: "..to presuppose freedom
as a positive concept would require an intellectual intuition which cannot here be
assumed" (66). Yet he still considers the moral law "firmly established of itself" (67).
Kant calls the mere "consciousness of the (moral) law a fact of reason" (68). It is a fact of
reason rather than an empirical fact for nowhere in our experience can we be certain that
it determines the will. Rather than justify the categorical imperative from the
presupposition of freedom, the moral law as a principle of autonomy instead accounts for
why we suppose we are free.
If Kant's account is correct, then the very fact that we make moral distinctions entails that
we do consider the moral law (as expressed by Kant) as valid. There are at least three
strong reason's why Kant's view is the best explanation of our moral experience. As I
have already argued in Chapter 2, the categorical imperative captures the importance of
motives in ordinary moral deliberation (which neither utilitarianism nor the principle of
utility do). So too, it functions simultaneously as a principle of autonomy. It thus clarifies
how we presuppose freedom in our actions when at the same time we view everything
else as obeying the laws of natures.
Finally, the categorical imperative lends each human being an absolute value in
themselves which Kant calls "dignity." The moral law considers each person as an end in
themself and thus, as a principle which should condition the will of all people, it bestows
dignity on all persons. This is the ideal of pure practical reason, which our moral practice
attempts to realize. It is mainly as a principle of autonomy, however, that the moral law
can bestow dignity. Our capacity to construct and follow our own principles allows us to
be unconditioned in the sense that we need not be determined by outside laws. A
heteronomous account of moI ality (Hume's, for instance), by contrast, regards people as

ultimately conditioned. Hume's doctrine is a heteronomous account in that he views
people as determined in the end by their sensuous feelings and yet feelings are
determined by principles which the feelings themselves do not determine.
It is important to note that the three preceding points are not intended to persuade people
that accepting the moral law is in their best interest. According to Kant, each of the three
points are part of the "fact of reason." It is a fact that motives are essential in ordinary
moral experience. It is a fact that we often presuppose our actions to be~freely
determined by ourselves and it is a fact that we ordinarily attribute (or should attribute)
dignity to each human being. We need to account for these important aspects of our
moral experience. Kant's notion of practical reason simply succeeds in this task better
then others.
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